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Water quality credit trading is a method by which firms and individuals can swap “rights 
to discharge” in order to lower the overall costs of reducing pollution while keeping the 
quality of the resource the same or better. Perhaps the most famous of these methods is 
used in air quality where sulfur emission allocations (credits) can be traded. Based on the 
notion of that program, quality credit trading is being considered in other environmental 
quality areas like water. However, this idea has also generated tremendous policy debate 
over the years. While trading water quality credits has been tried with various degrees of 
success in other states it has not yet been used in Kentucky. We discuss the potential 
costs and benefits that trading provides and the basic market structures that could be 
considered.  
 
The basic idea of the program is simple: allow businesses and individuals to exchange 
rights to pollute, while holding the overall level of pollution to a given standard. This 
process gives an incentive to emitters who have relatively low costs of abatement to 
reduce their emissions as much as possible, by providing them with the ability to earn 
credits that they can sell to emitters that have relatively high costs of abatement. Thus, 
the overall costs are lowered–those with the lowest costs make the greatest amount of 
reductions, while those that find abatement expensive do not have to actually make 
reductions in effluent, but can purchase credits to cover their emissions. The overall 
quality of the resource does not change, at least in theory, because the number of credits 
available is limited to keep the total amount of pollution the same, as it would be without 
the program. The number of credits available can also be gradually reduced so that the 
overall level of pollution decreases.  
 
The problem comes in setting up a system whereby trades can be made. Trades must be 
legally allowable–comply with all rules and regulations and credits must be set in such a 
way that the credit being offered for sale is equivalent to the credit that is needed by the 
buyer. The location of the trades should be similar so that the reductions take place in one 
local while the credit use (i.e. non-reductions) take place in another. And the pollutants 
(type and amount) involved in the trade should have the same biological impact, so that 
quality levels stay the same or improve. Trading ratios are developed to meet these 
requirements. Trading ratios in water quality have not been standardized–so the variables 
involved have to be carefully considered for the market system used.  
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There are several types of market systems that can be used for a basis for trading. Several 
market systems have been tried in other states; however, credit markets have not yet been 
evaluated within the state of Kentucky. Kentucky represents a unique environment 
because of its geology and socio-economic position. Geologically, the state is 
underpinned by limestone, which results in a karst environment. Numerous streams and 
rivers dip underneath the ground and resurface miles downstream making managing 
water pollution a challenge. 
 
The most simple market system is one in which one emitter makes an arrangement with 
another for a particular credit allocation. This one-on-one approach, also known as 
bilateral negotiations, is administratively intensive for all involved. The buyer/seller must 
find each other, generate and agree to a contract for the credits. The regulatory agency 
then must approve the agreement–insuring that the quality trade does in fact result in no 
loss in environmental quality (EPA, 2008). This market structure does not encourage a 
high number of trades, because emitters have to go through so much work to make the 
trade. 
 
At the other extreme a market exchange provides a trading environment in which buyers 
and sellers can easily find each other to make a trade. And because multiple trades are 
taking place, the going price of quality credits is easily observed. Credits and trading 
ratios have to be very uniform in this environment so that buyers and sellers can make 
comparisons between the prices and quantities being offered. Participants in this market 
also need the assurance that whatever credit they buy is equivalent to the credit they need 
for compliance (EPA, 2008). The only possible assurance is the regulatory standard by 
which the credits are generated, bought, and sold. Therefore, while relatively simple for 
buyers and sellers, the regulatory aspect of this program is intense.  
 
The water-quality clearinghouse market structure is another trading environment. In this 
environment an intermediary like the government is responsible for generating the 
credits. Credits generated under this system are paid for and monitored by the third party 
and then sold to emitters that want to use them. This system combines the market 
exchange and the bilateral negotiations. However, the regulatory burden is still high 
under this system.  
 
Finally, sole source offsets are often considered under trading programs even though they 
do not actually involve trades between multiple businesses or organizations. Under this 
system an emitter can generate credits for himself by reducing pollution in another area. 
These offsets can result in the same cost savings as traditional trades, but care must still 
be taken to not create a reduction in water quality as a result of the in-house trade. 
 
We will conclude the discussion by outlining the policy debate regarding the water 
quality trading programs.  
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Water Quality Trading (WQT) is an innovative approach for pollution mitigation that 
would trade pollution rights. With WQT, there is potential to include non-point sources 
(NPS) of pollution that have thus far been excluded from the federal regulations that are 
in effect for point sources (PS) of pollution through the Clean Water Act. There is interest 
to make Kentucky River watershed farmers participate in water quality conservation 
through a WQT scheme. Such a market would trade pollution rights between point 
sources and non-point sources of pollution. Through trades, pollution cost of compliance 
can be smaller compared to a pollution fee, and pollution can be reduced in a larger 
amount than with the tax option or standards. Such WQT innovative schemes between 
NPS and PS have not yet been very successful due to farmers’ low participation (Breetz 
et al., 2004).  
 
This study tries to find if a relationship exists between specific farm operations, extension 
programs and sources of government funding that target conservation practices. Farm 
profile that receives funding to engage in conservation in the potential context of a 
trading scheme of water quality is introduced. From the results, inferences can be made 
for the design of a successful feasibility study about WQT in the Kentucky River 
watershed. 
 
This study makes the following contribution to the literature: First, this is the first such 
analysis ever conducted in the Kentucky River watershed. Second, in addition to farm 
and farmer characteristics, additional secondary data were gathered in this study, which 
may be more relevant to the decision of adoption. Such data included the impact of 
university extension contacts and programs that are related to environment protection and 
resource use. Third, we present our study in the context of WQT, which generates both 
pushes and pulls towards producers’ decision to participate in government payment 
programs. The dynamics between cost-share funds and the incentives in WQT can be 
better explored. 
 
With the help of the Farm Service Agency (FSA) monthly Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) Contract Reports, from the National Agricultural Statistical Service 
(NASS) of the 2007 Census of Agriculture (County data), secondary data on CRP 
payments (funding) per county were collected. Also data were collected on number of 
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farms per county, average farm area, percentage of crop area per county, percentage of 
pasture area per county, the level of Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) 
payments per county, the level of Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) payments 
per county, from the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) KY State 
Conservationist County database. And finally, from the Kentucky Cooperative Extension 
System reports from the University of Kentucky, secondary data were also collected on 
the total number of extension contacts made by KY state extension specialists. Previous 
studies have used measurements of farmer education and have found they positively 
contributed to a larger participation in conservation programs through BMP adoption (P. 
Ghazalian, B. Larue, and G. West, 2009). 
 
Preliminary results show that the level of CRP payments positively correlates with the 
number of farms, average farm size, and percentage of cropland in a county. But, the 
higher the percentage of pastureland in a county, the lower the CRP payments, which was 
expected since CRP is a land retirement program, it financially rewards conversion of 
cropland into grasslands or forestlands. CRP payments are affected by multiple program 
participation, where EQIP is positively related to CRP, whereas WHIP is negatively 
related. Finally, the number of concurrent extension contacts made by Kentucky state 
agriculture extension specialists does not have strong impact on the level of total CRP 
payments in a county. Further analysis is to prove the lagged effects of extension 
contacts. 
 
Creating a market for water pollution mitigation from agriculture presents some 
challenges. Uncertainty over the number of offsets or allowances agriculture can produce 
is one issue. The transactions costs of bringing together buyers and sellers in a market for 
offsets can be high, because of agriculture’s heterogeneous nature and the fact that offsets 
are associated with the land. Finally, lack of coordination between conservation programs 
and markets could affect market function. WQT markets and conservation programs may 
compete for the same land, driving up the price of offsets. Enrollment in conservation 
programs may raise the issue of additionality, and whether practices adopted with support 
from financial assistance can be a source of offsets or allowances. The present paper is 
successful in attempting to provide a framework for a WQT development, showing that 
regions that contain large farms and greater number of farms are prone to conservation 
practices adoption if there is compensation. Future research including farmers’ inputs on 
the trading schemes and scenarios, and a thorough mapping of the region’s physical 
characteristics and NPS and PS locations will conclude a successful assessment of the 
feasibility of a WQT. 
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Introduction 
Since the 1972 enactment of federal legislation known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), 
point-source (PS) polluters (e.g., municipal wastewater treatment plants) have been 
required to obtain permits and comply with effluent restrictions under the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). Although significant progress has 
been made, substantial challenges remain. Reports indicate that up to 64% of assessed 
surface water bodies remain impaired, unable to support their designated uses (EPA, 
2009). Non-point sources (NPS) of pollution—including nutrients (nitrogen and 
phosphorus) and sediment from agricultural runoff—are a leading factor in this 
impairment. 
 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), charged with administering regulations 
under the CWA, supports the use of water quality trading (WQT) programs as a means to 
address current water quality problems (EPA, 2003). Such programs have the potential to 
pursue several desirable objectives. Offset credit mechanisms can expand participation in 
water quality improvement to hitherto unregulated agricultural producers and similar 
NPS polluters, by providing financial incentives to engage in voluntary abatement. 
 
It is widely held that the marginal abatement costs are lower for NPS than for the heavily 
regulated PS polluters, such that WQT has the potential to significantly lower the costs to 
society of achieving a given level of water quality (Faeth, 2000). However, cost-
reduction can occur even when trading takes place among PS with heterogeneous cost 
structures (e.g., due to differences in age or type of equipment, economies of scale, nature 
of influents) without participation by NPS. WQT programs also have the potential to 
increase flexibility and availability of different options for improving water quality and to 
encourage innovation in related technology. Similar programs related to control of air 
quality have enjoyed substantial success (Stavins, 1998). 
 
Research Objectives 
This research develops a profile of current point-source pollution in the Kentucky River 
watershed, as part of a larger project to evaluate the feasibility of a WQT program in this 
area. Particular attention is paid to characteristics related to the objectives and 
requirements of WQT specified by EPA policy (EPA, 2003). Thus, we focus on nutrient-
related impairments, examine PS locations relative to potential NPS participants, analyze 
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potential trading areas corresponding to receiving waters and TMDL boundaries, and 
allow for non-degradation constraints for individual segments. 
 
Data and Methodology 
The study relies on NPDES permit and compliance data made available by the Kentucky 
Division of Water. We build upon the methodologies of Roberts, et al (2008) and Kieser 
& Associates (2004) to delineate potential WQT markets and analyze PS characteristics. 
We examine alternative regulatory scenarios to compare trading feasibility under 
different conditions. In addition, GIS software was used to examine the geospatial 
connections among PS, NPS, and impaired waters. 
 
Results 
Preliminary results suggest that potential for trading is limited under current regulatory 
standards. However, stricter regulation of point sources as states try to comply with water 
quality standards could create potential for WQT as a mechanism for decreasing the costs 
of such compliance. 
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Introduction 
Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution from agricultural practices is generally exempt from 
federal regulation. However, some voluntary programs allow point sources subject to the 
Clean Water Acts’s (CWA) effluent limitations to meet their standards by purchasing 
offset credits reflecting reductions in NPS discharges to the same waters (USEPA 2004). 
Such water quality trading (WQT) programs have been implemented in a number of 
states to reduce pollution abatement costs (Breetz et al 2004). In this setting, NPS supply 
pollution abatement when they implement best management practices (BMP) that reduce 
nutrient loads, and the cost of BMPs form a supply curve for credits. WQT programs are 
supported by the EPA as an important means for efficiently pursuing water quality goals 
(USEPA 2003).  
 
Among the BMPs available for water quality management, riparian buffer strips have 
proven effective in mitigating the movement of nutrients and other pollutants into surface 
waters (Qiu et al 2006). Estimates of riparian buffer costs would be valuable for 
developing policy related to WQT and other conservation programs. This paper estimates 
the annual costs of buffer strips in six counties in the Lower Kentucky River Basin, as 
part of a project evaluating the feasibility of WQT programs in that area.  
 
Objectives 
The objectives of this study include: 1) Quantify the annualized costs of installing and 
maintaining a 200-foot riparian buffer strip on agricultural land adjoining waterways in 
the watershed. 2) Develop a supply curve for such buffer strips, which can be converted 
to the supply curve for offset credits in a WQT system.  
 
Methodology  
We select six counties in the Lower Kentucky River Basin, which are characterized by a 
high proportion of nutrient-impaired waterways and for which a total maximum daily 
load (TMDL) of pollutants either has been approved or is under development. These 
characteristics indicate that NPS offset credits may be in demand for those counties.  
 
To estimate costs, we adapt the methodology used by Roberts et al (2009). Potential 
buffer strip areas are geographically located and their agricultural land uses are identified 
using National Land Cover Data (USGS, 2001) and ArcGIS software. In the Lower 
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Kentucky River Basin, a 200-foot riparian buffer strip throughout the entire watershed 
would cover 176,155 hectares (7.7% of all land in the basin). Of this area, 61,914 
hectares are classified as pasture/hay and 2,949 hectares are classified as row crops.  
 
The cost of riparian buffers on cropland includes the opportunity cost for forgone 
production, as well as the costs of establishing and maintaining the buffer strips. Forgone 
production (weighted average return per hectare, corn and soybeans) is determined from 
cropping practices and soil fertility, using spatially disaggregated data from the Web Soil 
Survey Database. The cost of riparian buffers on pasture land is derived from average 
rental rates and the cost of exclusion (fencing), as well as establishment and maintenance 
expenses.  
 
These costs can be aggregated over the six counties, forming a supply curve of the buffer 
strip area that would be supplied at various prices, assuming that the price equals the 
marginal cost of an additional hectare of buffer strip. In turn, the supply of buffer strips 
can be converted into a supply function for NPS nutrient reductions, which can then be 
compared with demand for such credits by point sources seeking to reduce their 
emissions to comply with federal regulation.  
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